Cloud architecture has become a valuable solution for different applications, such as big data analytics, due to its high degree of availability, scalability and strategic value. However, there still remain challenges in managing cloud architecture, in areas such as cloud security. In this paper, we exploit software-defined networking (SDN) and blockchain technologies to secure cloud management platforms from a networking perspective. We develop a blockchain-powered SDN-enabled networking infrastructure in which the integration between blockchain-based security and autonomy management layer and multi-controller SDN networking layer is defined to enhance the integrity of the control and management messages. Furthermore, our proposed networking infrastructure also enables the autonomous bandwidth provisioning to enhance the availability of cloud architecture. In the simulation section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed blockchain-powered SDN-enabled networking infrastructure by considering different scenarios.
INTRODUCTION
"Cloud" is a vast network of remote servers around the globe, which are interconnected and meant to operate as a single ecosystem. The market penetration for cloud services has been increasing in recent years due to its extensive benefits, such as high-valued flexibility, efficiency and strategic value. Due to its high penetration signified by the benefits, cloud architecture has become a "necessity" more than just a "choice" nowadays. However, there still remain essential challenges for managing the cloud architecture, in areas such as cloud security that can be compromised due to various factors. Cloud servers, which are divided geographically, typically use their dedicated networking infrastructure. For example, Google Cloud Platform uses their own Fiber to inter-connect various geographically separated facilities. When Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) can't sufficiently support their own cloud networking infrastructure, they may rely on a third party for networking services. This reliance on third-party networking services, whose trustworthiness cannot be guaranteed, can bring in additional security concerns. Various techniques have been proposed to enhance the security of the networking support of the cloud architecture. The authors in [1] proposed a mechanism to detect conflicting SDN related flow rules in a highly dynamic cloud computing environment. In [2] Chowhary et al. proposed a game-theoretic approach to detect DDOS attacks in a cloud environment by leveraging the programmability of SDN. These techniques are effective in managing the cloud environment. However, since the critical state variables are stored within a controller, the sophisticated attacks can be launched to manipulate these variables. An SDN-based framework was proposed in [3] for cloud security, which utilizes a centralized Security Manager to detect the falsely injected packets. This framework is effective when the centralized security manager works normally. However, due to its centralized nature, the security manager is highly susceptible to single point of failure, which can result in compromising the entire security layer. To address these issues, in this paper we develop a networking infrastructure to improve the transparency of the networking entities and enhance the security of the networking service. Our proposed networking solution can be applied for both private and public clouds. Furthermore, our networking infrastructure is developed by exploiting SDN and blockchain technologies.
SDN is a promising technology that removes the control plane from individual switches and transfer it to a centralized controller which possesses the topological view of the entire network [4]. This technology outperforms the conventional decentralized TCP/IP networking infrastructure by enabling comprehensive end-to-end controls with low-operational cost, having programmable hardware, and achieving automated decision making in network management. The rich southbound APIs are used to realize the network as well as push necessary configurations to the data plane switches. Therefore, in recent decades, SDN technologies have gained widespread popularity in different application fields [5] , in which SDNs are used to establish the connectivity and traffic shaping amongst geographically separated hosts (i.e. physical servers) as well as logically separated tenants (i.e. virtual machines) in cloud architecture. In this work, we design a multi-controller SDN networking layer with OpenFlow 1.3 [6] as the southbound protocol. For simulation purposes, we have used Mininet, which is a Rapid Prototyping framework for SDN, with Ryu Controller [7] . Additionally, Ofsoftswitch13
[8] is used as the OpenFlow switch for simulation.
Blockchain is an emerging technology, which can be considered as an immutable and decentralized digital ledger [9] . A blockchain is a growing list of records, called blocks, which are linked cryptographically. Each block mainly contains the hash value of the previous block, the transaction data, and the timestamp. Due to the inherent cryptographic chaining, if a malicious party tries to manipulate certain transaction data, it will cause the changes of the hash values of the block containing the transaction and those of all the subsequent blocks, which can be easily detected. Therefore, generally speaking, blockchain technology provides a very promising solution for integrity and security. Amongst various existing blockchain platforms, Ethereum and Bitcoin are two of the most widely adopted ones [12] [13] . Compared with Bitcoin, Ethereum platform provides scripting functionalities via smart contracts. In our proposed networking solution, we exploit Ethereum blockchain and impose security functionalities automatically via smart contracts. The authors would like to claim that the technologies presented in this paper have been include in a provisional patent [11] . Overall, the contributions of our work in this paper mainly consists of: (1) designing a blockchain based security and autonomy management layer to ensure availability and autonomy of multi-controller networking layer, (2) designing a blockchainenabled bandwidth provisioning mechanism to securely provide assured end-to-end connectivity, (3) developing a hardware-in-the-loop testbed to emulate complex networking topologies.
The next section describes our proposed blockchain powered SDN-enabled networking infrastructure. Simulation and results are shown in Section III followed by final remarks and the conclusion in Section IV.
II. OUR PROPOSED BLOCKCHAIN-POWERED SDN-BASED NETWORKING INFRASTRUCTURE
The overview of our proposed blockchain-powered SDNenabled networking infrastructure is illustrated in Fig. 1 . Our infrastructure mainly comprises two layers: (1) multicontroller SDN networking layer, and (2) blockchain-based security and autonomy management layer. The interaction between these two layers are realized by connecting SDN controllers via a blockchain-based autonomous security mechanism. Overall, our networking infrastructure is developed to realize three main functionalities: (1) integrity verification for control and management commands for cloud platforms, (2) identification of the malicious hosts abusing the cloud platform, and (3) enhance the availability of the cloud platform via autonomous bandwidth provisioning.
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A. Multi-Controller SDN Networking Layer
Considering the scalability issue of the conventional centralized SDN, in our multi-controller SDN networking layer, OpenFlow-enabled switches span across different domains in each of which there is an SDN controller. To realize networking, both intra-domain and inter-domain communication are enabled as shown in Fig. 1 . Different domains are connected with each other in a decentralized manner via domain-edge switches, which forms the data plane back-bone network, while different controllers are connected with each other in the vicinity to form the decentralized controller plane.
Furthermore, there are primarily two strategies for designing multi-controller SDN networking layer: (1) horizontal architecture, in which the controllers are interconnected in a peer-to-peer fashion, and (2) hierarchical architecture, in which all the controllers are connected to one centralized controller which is responsible for controller management. One major drawback of the hierarchical architecture is that the centralized controller is highly vulnerable to single point of failure. Therefore, we design our multi-controller SDN networking layer by adopting the horizontal architecture.
B. Interaction with Blockchain-Based Security and
Autonomy Management Layer
1) Integrity Verification Mechanism
In our networking infrastructure, a verification mechanism is designed to verify the integrity of the critical control and management commands for the cloud platform. This mechanism is realized via the interaction between the multicontroller SDN networking layer and the blockchain-based security and autonomy management layer. Securing critical inter-controller communications for the realization of multicontroller SDN will improve the availability of the networking infrastructure. As illustrated in Fig. 2 , whenever an SDN controller is ready to send a control/management command, it generates a combined hash of the command data and the timestamp associated with the command. In our work, the combined hash value is calculated via MD5 message-digest algorithm [10] . Then the SDN controller records the hash value as a state variable in a smart contract in the blockchainbased layer. After generating and recording the hash value, the controller sends the control command with the timestamp to the targeted SDN controller (receiver). After receiving the command, the controller verifies the integrity of the command by hashing the received information, including the command and its associated timestamp, and checking against the blockchain smart contract to find out whether the aforementioned hash was previously generated in the system.
Check the buffered values against
Blockchain smart contract Additionally, the receiver can store the hash values in a buffer until being verified. To avoid interrupting the communications with critical latency criteria, if it is necessary, the receiver can directly deploy received control commands without verifying the integrity. In the meantime, the buffered hash values are verified against the hash values recorded via the state variables in smart contracts.
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2) Detection Mechanism for Malicious Hosts
To prevent malicious hosts from abusing the cloud platform, we develop a detection mechanism that detects malicious hosts by identifying the authorization of the individual hosts. As the first step for achieving the objective, currently we assume that every valid host acquires an IP address using Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) from the associated SDN controllers. Furthermore, we also assume that the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) has a knowledge of all the available MAC addresses in its management domain. Therefore, the CSP is able to bind an IP address to available MAC addresses and record the IP-MAC association in our blockchain-based security and autonomy layer, which ensures the immutable exchange of such information within controllers. A typical IP-MAC association table is illustrated in Table I .
When a host requests an IP via DHCP, the SDN controller checks whether the host's MAC address is available in the IP-MAC association table in the blockchain-based layer. If it is, the controller concludes that the authorization of the host has been verified and release the corresponding IP address to the host. At the connection establishment phase, controller will also check the integrity of associated ARP messages which is illustrated in the Fig. 3 . By doing so, our networking solution ensures that two hosts cannot establish an end-to-end IP association without a qualifying ARP request-reply pair.
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3) Autonomous Bandwidth Provisioning Mechanism
In our proposed networking solution, an autonomous bandwidth provisioning mechanism is developed to enhance the availability of the cloud platform. As illustrated in Fig. 4 , in our proposed mechanism, the immutability and scripting functionality of the blockchain is exploited to impose Service Level Agreements (SLAs) into the networking logic. Additionally, the scripting functionality of the blockchain and the metering and queueing functionality of the OpenFlow Switch Specification are employed to realize the real-time awareness of the available bandwidths of each links.
In this work, we assume that the malicious traffic flows are identified and discarded via our integrity verification mechanism and the detection mechanism for malicious hosts. Additionally, we consider the normal traffic flows can be classified into two categories: guaranteed traffic flows and best-effort traffic flows. This classification is automatically realized according to the flag segment in a SLA definition table. An example of SLA definition table is illustrated in Table II . In this table, the first and second row correspond to guaranteed traffic that is identified by Flag 1, and the third row corresponds to best-effort traffic that is identified by Flag 0. When a provisioning request comes from a host, the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) imposes the associated SLA entry in the SLA definition table via the blockchain smart contract in our blockchain-based security and autonomy management layer. All the entries of the SLA definition table are recorded as structs and a mapping datatype is used to store all the entries in the blockchain-based layer with each data entry (of type struct) is mapped with an index (of type unit256). The entries of the SLA definition table are also updated in real-time via the blockchain smart contract in order to reflect the changes in underlying networking state. Then the host sends a provisioning request to establish the end-to-end connection and the SDN controllers deploy the requested flow according to the mechanism illustrated in Fig.  5 . If it is a best-effort service request, the SDN controller routes the traffic along the shortest path from source to destination. To achieve this automatically, one critical datastructure, traversal edge-switch matrix, is defined via the blockchain smart contract. A certain entry of this matrix shows the corresponding edge-switch when traversing from one controller to another. This matrix is used to identify the two domain-edge switches corresponding to the domain of each controller that participates in the packet switching process for a certain source and destination. This information is fed to individual controller to find the local shortest paths of each controller. If the request from the host is a guaranteed service request, the associated source SDN controller checks whether there is enough bandwidth available from source to destination for the guaranteed flow.
In our proposed networking infrastructure, each port contains a queue to service the guaranteed traffic. There's no queue defined for the best-effort traffic. Figure 6 represents the bandwidth allocation inside a certain link. As shown in Fig. 6 , the guaranteed traffic has a predefined maximum guaranteed bandwidth. Additionally, due to its nature of expansion and shrinking based on the throughput, the networking resources can be utilized efficiently without any resource exhaustion.
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To automatically identify whether there is sufficient bandwidth available for the guaranteed traffic, two critical data-structures are defined via the blockchain smart contract: (1) Inter-controller link bandwidth matrix that records all the links connecting the SDN controllers and their available bandwidths, and (2) Intra-controller link bandwidth matrix that records the bandwidths of all the available links within the domain of individual controllers. These two matrices are used to track all the available bandwidths throughout the network and make decision on the bandwidth provisioning for a given pair of source and destination hosts. If there is sufficient bandwidth available, the provisioning request can be fulfilled successfully and the availability of the bandwidth is updated in the blockchain-based layer accordingly. If there is no sufficient bandwidth available, a decision making procedure is implemented on identifying an alternative guaranteed path. If there are no appropriate guaranteed path candidates available, traffic will be sent along the best-effort path. The data flow is automatically switched back to the guaranteed path when the bandwidth becomes sufficient. During this provisioning procedure, new provisioning requests are blocked to ensure that link bandwidths have been updated accurately before new provisioning decisions can be made.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed blockchain-powered SDN-enabled networking infrastructure by considering two case studies. In Case A, we focus on demonstrating the performance of the verification mechanism in our networking infrastructure, which is designed to verify the integrity of the critical control and management commands for the cloud platform. In Case B, we focus on evaluating the performance of our proposed autonomous bandwidth provisioning mechanism.
A. Case Study A
In this case study, we consider that the multi-SDN networking layer comprises of three controllers, C0, C1, and C2 as shown in Fig. 7 . The three SDN domains associated with these individual controllers are connected with each other via domain-edge Switches S5, S10 and S11 that are used for interdomain traffic. The host (h1) associated with C1 intends to establish the communication with the host (h2) associated with C0. We assume that h1 and h2 do not have the knowledge about each other's MAC address. Initially, h1 floods a control command, in this case an ARP request, requesting the MAC address of h2 throughout all the controller domains. The ARP request is propagated to C0 and C2. The communication between the hosts associated with C0 and C1 is established after h2 responds to the ARP request successfully. The screenshot of the terminals associated with the three SDN controllers are shown in Fig. 8, which As shown in Fig. 8(a) , When C1 sends the ARP request of h1 to other controllers, it also hashes the content and timestamp of the ARP request and records the combined hash value in the blockchain-based security and autonomy layer by uploading it as a state variable in the blockchain smart contract. From Fig. 8(b) , we can see that, after receiving the ARP request, both the controllers C0 and C2 validate the integrity of the received command against the blockchain smart contract. After the cross-validation is completed successfully, the controller C0 replies to the request as shown in Fig. 8(c) . The integrity of response from C0 is also verified at C1 using the same validation mechanism.
B. Case Study B
In this case study, we consider a networking layer which has depth = 2 and fan-out = 4, which is shown in Fig. 9 . We assume that maximum link bandwidth is 9.4 Mbps. The queue functionality of the OpenFlow Switch Specification is applied to achieve the guaranteed bandwidth of 5 Mbps for each port, which enables logically defining a tunnel for the guaranteed traffic. Four different service-request traffics are considered in this simulation, which is detailed in Table III. As shown in Table III , the traffics BE 1 and BE 2 are the best-effort service-request traffics and the traffics Guaranteed 1 and Guaranteed 2 are the guaranteed service-request traffics. We assume that these four traffic flows are selected for the analysis in such a way that all of them are routed via the same shortest path. During the simulation, there only exist the traffics BE 1 and BE 2 from time t = 0s to 203s. The traffics Guaranteed 1 and Guaranteed 2 appear beginning from time step t = 203s. The bandwidth occupancy is shown in Fig. 10 .
Flow
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Between Host 1 and Host 5 As shown in Fig. 10 , the best-effort service-request traffics BE 1 and BE 2 are able to occupy the entire available link bandwidth until t = 203s. The guaranteed service-request traffics appear at t = 203s, whose guaranteed bandwidths are 1.8 Mbps and 2.8 Mbps, respectively. These two guaranteed traffics use almost all the guaranteed bandwidth that is 5 Mbps. The immutability and the scripting functionality of the blockchain technology in our blockchain-based layer are exploited to securely and automatically impose the SLAs to the network logic. For example, in this case study the blockchain-based layer ensures that the total bandwidth of the flows in the guaranteed queue should be less or equal to guaranteed queue maximum bandwidth. The metering functionality of the OpenFlow Switch Specification in the networking layer is exploited to bandlimit the traffics Guaranteed 1 and Guaranteed 2 to 1.8 Mbps and 2.8 Mbps inside the guaranteed queue, respectively, which is implemented to prevent any potential resource exhaustion.
The packet-loss rates for the individual traffics are shown in Fig. 11. From Fig. 11 , we can observe during the time window [1s,203s], the packet-loss rates for the traffics BE 1 and BE 2 are neglectable. This is reasonable because that their requested bandwidths are 5.7 Mbps and 3.7 Mbps, respectively. The total requested bandwidth, 9.4 Mbps, is approximately equal to the total available link bandwidth, and thus these two traffics do not interfere each other. Additionally, we can observe significant packet-loss rate for BE 1 and BE 2 beginning from time t = 203 s. This is because that the two guaranteed traffics, Guaranteed 1 and Guaranteed 2, which appear beginning from t = 204s, take up to 4.6 Mbps bandwidth. Because of this, the bandwidth available for the two best-effort traffics is reduced from 9.4 Mbps to approximately 5 Mbps. Furthermore, we can observe that the packet-loss rates of the two guaranteed traffics are very low throughout the simulation, which illustrate the effectiveness of the metering and queue functionalities of the OpenFlow Switch Specification in the networking layer and the immutability and scripting functionality provided by the blockchain-based security and autonomy layer.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have developed a blockchain-powered SDN-enabled networking infrastructure to enhance the security of the cloud management, such as integrity and availability. Our proposed networking infrastructure mainly consists of two layers: multi-controller SDN networking layer and blockchain-based security and autonomy layer. The integration of these two layers is designed to enhance the integrity of the control and management commands. We would like to mention that in our framework, blockchainbased security and autonomy management layer interacts with multi-controller SDN networking layer via the SDN controller level, which allows the decision making in larger time scale and mitigates the impact of the blockchain-based management layer on the complexity of networking layer. Furthermore, our proposed networking infrastructure also enables the autonomous bandwidth provisioning to improve the availability of the cloud architecture. The simulation results in two case studies have illustrated the effectiveness of our proposed networking solution in enhancing the integrity and availability of the cloud management. In our ongoing work, we are developing a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed to further evaluate the performance of our work. Furthermore, we are working on evaluating the availability and scalability of the proposed framework by developing a large scale test system and designing more complex networking scenarios.
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